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TERMINATION OF TRUSTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
By MARK E. LEFEVER t
I. INTRODUCTION *
Within the past fifteen years the courts have frequently been
called upon to consider the problem of termination of trusts. The
increased activity in this phase of the law of trusts has been due largely
to the financial depression of the 1930's and the consequent decrease in
the productivity of trust estates. Trusts, which at the time of their
creation seemed certain to produce a comfortable income for the bene-
ficiaries, suffered so severe a diminution of their income-producing
capacity that the beneficiaries found themselves burdened rather than
benefited by the continued existence of the trusts.1 The numerous
attempts of beneficiaries to obtain relief from such unproductive trusts
have focused attention sharply upon the problem of termination.
The general law on this subject is comprehensively set forth in
the Restatement of the Law of Trusts.2 Responding to the demands
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1. For example, Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 37 D. & C. 324 (Pa. C.
P. 1940). In that case, settlor created a $200,000 spendthrift trust in 1928, with income
to herself for life and remainder as she would appoint by will, or, in default of appoint-
ment, to her next of kin. By 1939, the original income of $8,000 per year had fallen
to $393. Creditors had attached "the cream of the investments." She was aged, ill,
needed medical attention, and faced dependency for support on private or governmental
charity.
2. REsTATEmENT, TRUSTS §§ 330-347 (1935).
(305)
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of the depressed economy of the times, the Pennsylvania courts have
gone far toward bringing the law of Pennsylvania into harmony with
the rules adopted in the Restatement.3 Section 2 of the Estates Act
of 1947 ' represents an effort by the Pennsylvania Legislature to extend
this phase of the law of trusts so as more freely to permit termination
of trusts in hardship cases and otherwise to solve the problem of the
oppressive and purposeless trust.5
II. THE PROBLEM
It frequently occurs that subsequent to the creation of a trust
(whether inter vivos or testamentary) circumstances arise which
induce an attempt by the interested parties to revoke or terminate
it prior to the expiration of the stated term. Such an attempt may be
made by the settlor seeking to rescind the trust he created, or by one
or more of those whom the trust was designed to benefit. Various
circumstances make such an effort seem expedient. Probably the
most frequent inducement is economic in nature, involving a shrinkage
of the trust corpus and/or a decrease in its productivity or, conversely,
an increase in the financial requirements of the petitioning beneficiary.
Trusts which at the time of their creation seemed certain to produce
income adequate for the needs of the beneficiaries often become in-
sufficiently productive to achieve their purpose.6 Life tenants and
even remaindermen, who have normally been able to support them-
selves on their current income, are often confronted with a financial
emergency from which resort to the trust corpus apparently offers
the sole means of escape. Need for relief from such unproductive,
inadequate, and oppressive trusts drew legislative attention to this
problem.
The words "revocation" and "termination" are often used inter-
changeably. However, there is at least a theoretical difference be-
tween revocation and termination, each of which provides for removal
of trust property from the restrictions of the trust instrument. Rev-
ocation generally signifies an act of the settlor whereby he exercises
a power reserved in the trust instrument or conferred by law to rescind
3. 91 U. oF PA. L. REv. 672 (1943).
4. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 301.2 (Purdon, Supp. June, 1947) (effective January
1, 1948).
5. The purpose of § 2 is not to restrict the existing law of termination, but to pro-
vide additional means for accomplishing this end. See note 10 infra.
6. For example, in Auchu's Estate, 38 D. & C. 33 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1939), Testator at
the time he wrote his will had a large estate. When Testator died, his estate was in-
ventoried at approximately $370,000. Nevertheless, by the time the testamentary
trust he created for his daughter was set up, the trust amounted to barely $1,000. For*
that reason, she sought termination.
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or cancel the trust.7 Termination, on the other hand, presupposes the
existence of a valid irrevocable trust and is the means by which such
a trust is brought to an end, either by the expiration of its term, the
accomplishment of its purpose, or (prior thereto) by agreement of the
parties or order of court.' Actually, the difference between revocation
and termination is primarily one of terminology and tends at times
to become indistinct and unimportant.9
The problem to which we shall address ourselves in this article
is a determination of the circumstances and conditions under which a
trust may be terminated: (a) under existing law (which is expressly
preserved by the new Act);10 and (b) under the Estates Act of
1947.
III. EXISTING LAW
A trust instrument, which is silent as to revocability, is irrevo-
cable." However, where the settlor of an inter vivos trust reserves to
himelf a power of revocation, that power may be exercised by him,'2
subject to the proviso that the exercise comply strictly with the terms
of the reservation.' 3 Likewise, a trust, whether inter vivos or testa-
mentary, which contains a grant to the beneficiaries of a power of
termination may be terminated in compliance with the terms of the
grant.
14
But even where there has been neither a reservation nor a grant
of such power, the courts have under certain circumstances decreed the
7. Revocation is "the annulment or cancellation of the instrument . . . by or on
behalf of the party who made it." 54 C. J. 772.
8. That "termination" is properly applicable to valid and irrevocable trusts is indi-
cated in RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 339, comment a (1935).
9. In Mellon v. Driscoll, 117 F. 2d 477 (C. C. A. 3rd 1941), the court said at 479:
"A power to terminate capable of being so exercised as to revest in the de-
cedent the ownership of the transferred property or an interest therein, or as other-
wise to inure to his benefit or the benefit of his estate, is, to that extent, the equiva-
lent of a power to 'revoke' . . ."
And in Svenson's Trust Estate, 25 Erie 14 (Pa. 1942), the court decreed "termina-
tion" of a trust upon the exercise by the settlor of her power of "revocation."
10. Section 2(c) of the ESTATES AcT OF 1947 brovides: "Nothing in this section
shall limit any power of the court to terminate or reform a trust under existing law."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(c) (Purdon, Supp. June, 1947).
11. Fry v. Mercantile Trust Co., 207 Pa. 640, 57 Atl. 43 (1904) ; Rynd v. Baker,
193 Pa. 486, 44 Atl. 551 (1899) ; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 330(2) (1935). If, how-
ever, a power to revoke was omitted through ignorance or inadvertence, the trust may
be revoked in spite of that omission: Bristor v. Tasker, 135 Pa. 110, 19 Atl. 851
(1890) ; Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528 (1884) ; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 332 (1935).
12. Ordinarily no intervention of the court is necessary. Settlor merely gives no-
tice of revocation to the trustee.
13. In re Reese's Estate, 317 Pa. 473, 177 Atl. 792 (1935) (revocation ineffective
because settlor died prior-to expiration of required 60-day period after giving notice
of termination) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 330, comment j (1935). However, a settlor
who reserves to himself a general testamentary power of appointment may, upon the
death of the life tenant release that power by inter vivos deed and terminate the trust:
Jackson's Estate, 50 D. & C. 292 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1944).
14. 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1000 (1934). Cf. In re Stewart's Estate,
253 Pa. 277, 98 AUt. 569 (1916).
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termination of both inter vivos and testamentary trusts. 5 Thus,
termination has been ordered where the purpose of the trust was illegal
or impossible of accomplishment,' 6 where the trust was created under a
mistake of fact,' 7 or under duress,'" or through undue influence.' 9
The doctrine of impossibility of fulfillment, which was originally
applied to cases wherein a testamentary scheme was upset by the
election of the widow to take against the will,"° has recently been
extended by a number of lower courts to permit termination in certain
hardship cases. Thus, where it can be shown that the productivity
of the trust estate has become inadequate for the needs of the bene-
ficiaries, termination may be decreed.2' This so-called "failure of
purpose" doctrine is an equitable and flexible device seized upon by
the courts as a means of affording relief in those cases where con-
tinued enforcement of the trust would be a burden to those intended
thereby to be benefited. In employing the doctrine to strike down an
oppressive trust, the courts ascribe to the settlor a general intention to
make adequate financial provisions for the beneficiary and, when con-
tinuance of the trust would jeopardize fulfillment of that intention,
employ their equitable powers to terminate.2
15. See Lefever, Trusts-Termination, FmucuY RE iEW (May, 1946).
16. In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 11, 130 Atl. 238 (1925) (trust terminated
because of illegal requirement that settlor's son be reared in the Roman Catholic faith) ;
Loew's Estate, 291 Pa. 22, 139 Atl. 582 (1927) (trust terminated because widow's
election made accomplishment of trust impossible); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 335
(1935). It is immaterial that the object of the trust was legal ab initio if subsequently
it becomes illegal: In re Morse, 247 N. Y. 290, 160 N. E. 374 (1928).
17. Rick's Appeal, 105 Pa. 528 (1884) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 333, comments
a and e (1935). But the mistake to be ground for termination must be one of fact and
not one of law: Peter v. Peter, 136 Md. 157, 110 Ati. 211 (1920).
18. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 333, comment e (1935) ; cf. Fountain v. Bigham, 235
Pa. 35, 84 Atl. 131 (1912).
19. More v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 297 Pa. 252, 146 Atl. 896 (1929) ; RE-
STATEMENT, TRUSTS § 333, comments a and e (1935).
20. Loew's Estate, 291 Pa. 22, 139 Atl. 582 (1927) ; In re Disston's Estate, 257 Pa.
537, 101 Atl. 804 (1917).
21. Auchu's Estate, 38 D. & C. 33 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1939); Tomlinson v. Land Title
Bank & Trust Co., Philadelphia C. P. No. 2, December Term, 1938, No. 2144 (unre-
ported) ; Reimer v. Provident Trust Co., Phila. C. P. No. 4, December Term, 1936,
No. 1295 (unreported). This is substantially the rule adopted in RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 336 (1935), wherein it is stated, "If . . . continuance of the trust would
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the trust, the court will . . per-
mit . . . termination." As stated in Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 37
D. & C. 324, 327 (Pa. C. P. 1940), the basis for these holdings is, ". . . the trust has
failed of its purpose . . . and it should now be terminated. . . ." To the same
effect, see Posey's Estate, 52 D. & C. 127 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1944). In Goodell's Estate, 53
D. & C. 13 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1945), the court upon petition of the living beneficiaries, ter-
minated a trust and awarded the corpus and undistributed income to the settlor on the
ground that shrinkage of the trust income caused the trust purpose to fail. Distribu-
tion was made to the settlor despite the fact that the trust instrument expressly for-
bade the settlor to appoint to himself.
22. Auchu's Estate, 38 D. & C. 33 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1939); Posey's Estate, 52 D. &
C. 127 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1944). It may'be that in Auchu's Estate, supra, the inferred in-
tention differed slightly from the actual intention. A reading of the applicable por-
tions of the trust instrument suggests that the settlor may have intended merely to
place his daughter's portion of his estate, whatever it might be, beyond her husband's
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The law in Pennsylvania is not clear as to whether all parties
in interest may terminate a trust whose purposes have not been ful-
filled. It has frequently been stated that under such circumstances
termination will be decreed; 23 the source of that statement is ap-
parently Culbertson's Appeal.24  In that case, however, the court
found that "the purposes of the trust have been fulfilled." 25 Conse-
quently, the statement that termination may be decreed regardless of
the non-fulfillment of a trust purpose was merely dictum. Similarly,
in none of the cases which have followed Culbertsonts Appeal and
approved the indicated principle, was there any trust purpose remain-
ing to be fulfilled.2 Indeed, some jurists, when quoting from Culbert-
son's Appeal, have deleted the words "and although all its purposes
may not have been accomplished." 27 Actually, despite the above
dictum, the law in Pennsylvania appears to be that all parties in inter-
est may not compel the termination of a trust whose purposes are not
fulfilled,28 and have not failed.29  This is in accord with the Restate-
ment, if "parties in interest" are restricted to beneficiaries and do not
include the settlor.
80
According to the "Restatement,81 the settlor and all beneficiaries
can compel termination of a trust regardless of the non-fulfillment of a
control. The difficult problem of inferring an intention is not present in those cases
where the settlor is alive and participates in the termination proceedings: Goodell's
Estate, 53 D. & C. 13 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1945) ; Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 37
D. & C. 324 (Pa. C. P. 1940).
23. 2 HUNTER, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT COMMOx PAcE Boox 1303
(1939). The same statement is contained in 39 VALE, PENNSYLVANi DIGEST, TRUSTS,
§ 61 (1) with cases cited in support. For some of the cases declaring this principle, see
note 26 infra.
24. 76 Pa. 145 (1874). In that case the court stated: "... although a trust may
not have ceased by expiration of time, and although all its purposes may not have been
accomplished, yet if all the parties who are or who may be interested in the trust prop-
erty are in existence and are sui juris, and if they all consent and agree thereto, courts
of equity may decree the determination of the trust ... " Id. at 148.
25. Id. at 149.
26. Price's Estate, 21 D. & C. 542 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1934); Behringer's Estate, 265 Pa.
111, 108 AUt. 414 (1919) ; Harrar's Estate, 244 Pa. 542, 91 Atl. 503 (1914). In John-
son v. Provident Trust Co., 280 Pa. 255, 124 At. 436 (1924) the court analyzed Har-
rar's Estate and found it not to be authority for the proposition set forth in Culbert-
son's Appeal, supra note 24.
27. Simmon's Estate, 3 D. & C. 323 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1923) ; Stafford's Estate, 258
Pa. 595, 102 AtI. 222 (1917). See also, I REMICK, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT
PRACTICE 721, n. 63a (4th ed. 1946).
28. Henderson's Estate, 258 Pa. 510, 102 Atl. 217 (1917) ; Stewart's Estate, 253
Pa. 277, 98 At. 569 (1916). Contra: Foyle's Estate, 26 Dist. 751 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1917).
Conversely all parties in interest can compel termination of trust whose purposes have
been fulfilled. Musser's Estate, 341 Pa. 1; 17 A. 2d 411 (1941).
29. It is necessary to qualify the general principle by adding "and have not failed"
in order to accommodate the "failure of purpose" cases. See Haines' Estate, Court of
Common Pleas No. 6, Philadelphia County, December Term, 1944, No. 598 (unre-
ported).
30. "If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose
of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination": RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§ 337(2) (1935).
31. § 338.
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trust purpose. The law of Pennsylvania has been declared to be in
accord with this principle. 2 However, some of the cases cited as
establishing the alignment of Pennsylvania law with the Restatement
do not accomplish that end. 3
Conversely, until recently there has been positive authority to the
*effect that a settlor and all beneficiaries cannot compel termination of a
trust whose purpose remains unfulfilled.84 However, if the only
unfulfilled purpose is that which a spendthrift trust is designed to
accomplish, a recent decision, Bowers' Trust Estate,5 holds that a set-
tlor and all beneficiaries may now compel termination. Furthermore,
the language in that decision is sufficiently broad to warrant termination
of any trust upon consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries, and regard-
less of any unfulfilled purpose.8 6
However, even where circumstances sufficiently compelling to
warrant termination of a trust are present, there exists a serious re-
striction upon the court's exercise of that power, namely, the require-
ment that all persons interested in the trust consent thereto. 37  This
requirement must be met whether the trust be inter vivos or
testamentary; whether the settlor be alive or dead; or whether all trust
purposes be fulfilled or not. The persons whose consent is necessary
must represent trust interests whose sum total is equivalent to an
absolute fee. Those persons include the life tenant, all remaindermen,
whether vested or contingent, ascertained or unascertained, living or
unborn; 8 and probably the settlor, if living.
32. See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS, PA. ANNOT. § 338 (1939).
33. Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145 (1874), wherein the trust purpose had been
fulfilled; Murray's Trust Estate, 121 Pa. Super. 55, 182 Atl. 736 (1936), wherein
settlor predeceased attempt at termination; Brown v. Williamson, 13 D. & C. 503 (Pa.
C. P. 1930), wherein the trust purpose ceased to exist.
34. Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 301, 165 Atl. 380 (1933)
Appeal of Twining, 97 Pa. 36 (1881).
35. 346 Pa. 85, 29 A. 2d 519 (1943).
36. Actually petitioners were life tenants of a sole and separate use trust who had
acquired the remainder interest.
Although the court based its decision upon the power of settlor and all benefici-
aries to compel termination despite the existence of a trust purpose, it could have relied
on the failure of purpose doctrine since the annual income shrank from $1800 to $400.
The court accepted the distinction made by the RESTATEMENT (but previously
ignored by the courts in Pennsylvania) between cases in which the settlor is deceased
and those in which he is alive.
37. Haines' Estate, Court of Common Pleas No. 6, Philadelphia County, Dec.
Term, 1944, No. 598 (unreported); Bowers' Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29 A. 2d 519
(1943) ; In re Donnan's Trust, 339 Pa. 43, 13 A. 2d 55 (1940) ; Jones' Trust Estate,
284 Pa. 90, 130 Atl. 314 (1925) ; King v. York Trust Co., 278 Pa. 141, 122 Atl. 227
(1923).
38. In Johnson v. Provident Trust Co., 4 D. & C. 248 (Pa. C. P. 1924), the court
held the consent of contingent remaindermen unnecessary, stating, ". . . a provision
in favor of contingent . . . remaindermen . . . does not prevent a termination
of the trust on the application and agreement of all persons having vested interests"
(citing cases). This holding was reversed on appeal, 280 Pa. 255, 124 Atl. 436 (1924).
However, in Auchu's Estate, 38 D. & C. 33 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1939) and Goodell's Estate,
53 D. & C. 13 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1945), termination was decreed over the objection of the
guardian ad litem representing unborn remaindermen.
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An analysis of that obstacle reveals its far reaching effects: (a)
the requirement that all persons who have or might have a beneficial
interest in an estate must consent to termination permits an attempted
termination to be frustrated by persons with only a remotely contingent
interest; (b) the requirement that the consent of unborn or unascer-
tained remaindermen is essential to termination makes termination
impossible in a large number of cases.
The requirement of consent of unborn or unascertained remainder-
men becomes more burdensome due to the traditional presumption
that a woman is legally capable of bearing children regardless of her
age or physical condition.39 Although that presumption has recently
been forced to yield to medical testimony to the contrary,40 it still
constitutes a serious handicap in many termination proceedings.41
The restrictive effect of this requirement is unfortunate in that it
permits the remote objects of the conveyor's bounty to frustrate the
enjoyment of the estate by the immediate objects of his bounty. For
it has been said that the life beneficiaries are generally those for whom
the trust is primarily designed.2
The inequity of such a result is demonstrated by the fact that
the remainders whose existence could frustrate the termination may
well have been created solely in order to divest a settlor of all of his
reversionary interest for tax purposes, or merely for the purpose of
naming some ultimate remaindermen after the death of all of the
primary objects of the bounty of the settlor.
The problem of revocation or termination of trusts has received
legislative attention in several sister states.48  In some, statutory pro-
vision has been made to mitigate the harshness of the rule requiring
the consent of all beneficiaries. The North Carolina statute permits
a settlor to revoke contingent interests in persons not born or ascer-
tained without the consent of any beneficiary.4 In Oklahoma any
39. List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1877) ; Daly's Estate, 26 Dist. 299 (Pa. Or. Ct.
1917). See Austin's Estate, 315 Pa. 449, 173 Atl. 278 (1934).
40. Leonard's Estate, 60 D. & C. 42 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1947) ; Barnsley's Estate, 59 D.
& C. 653 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1947). Although there appear to be no reported cases in which
the court has recognized a rebuttal of the presumption of the procreative ability of a
man, in at least one unreported decision weight was given to evidence tending to prove
sterility.
41. Because of the fact that the ability to bear children may theoretically persist
beyond the age at which, according to common experience, sterility occurs, the quan-
tum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption is great. See Austin's Estate, 315
Pa. 449, 173 AtI. 278 (1934).
42. ". . . in nearly all instances of long continuing trusts, the life tenants are the
primary objects of the bounty of testators . . .": Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 2), 327
Pa. 171, 173, 193 Atl. 30, 32 (1937). To the same effect, see Goodell's Estate, 53 D.
& C. 13, 21 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1945).
43. Statutes dealing with the problem are in effect in California, New York, Okla-
homa and Texas.
44. "The grantor . " who has heretofore created or may hereafter create a
voluntary trust . . . with a future contingent interest to some person or persons
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trust which is silent as to revocability may be revoked by the settlor
alone; if expressly irrevocable, it may be revoked with the consent of
living persons having vested or contingent interests.45 "Contingent
interests," as defined in that statute, are only those interests which a
benieficiary may take as purchaser under the trust instrument, and not
those which pass by descent. Consequently, a limitation to a cestui for
life and thereafter to his testamentary appointees or next of kin may
be revoked by the settlor and life beneficiary without the consent of
next of kin, the latter taking by descent and not by purchase.
A similar result has been reached in cases arising under Section
23 of the New York Personal Property Law,4" which provides for
revocation by the settlor with the consent of "all persons beneficially
interested in a trust . . ." Although the New York statute does
not expressly so provide, it has been construed to require only the
consent of living beneficiaries who take as purchasers.4 7 Inasmuch
as it is the requirement that the consent of unborn and unascertained
remaindermen be obtained which often prevents the desired destruction
of a trust, the North Carolina, Oklahoma and New York statutes, by
obviating the need for that consent, increase the opportunity for reach-
ing trust property.
It is to these obstacles, namely, the necessity of showing failure of
the trust purpose, and of obtaining the consent of all beneficiaries as
conditions precedent to the termination of the trust, that Section 2 of
the Estates Act of 1947 was particularly directed.
IV. THE ESTATES ACT
(a) History
The problem of the oppressive trust and the desirability of pro-
viding a means whereby such a trust might, under proper circum-
stances, be terminated was given consideration by the Advisory Com-
mittee of the Joint State Government Commission on Decedents'
not in esse or not determined until the happening of a future event may at any time,
prior to the happening of the contingency . . . revoke the grant of the interest to
such person or persons . . ." N. C. CODE § 996 (1931). By amendment, the statute
does not apply to trusts expressly made irrevocable. N. C. LAWS 1943, 'C. 437, § 1.
45. "Every trust shall be revocable by The trustor, unless expressly made irrevo-
cable by the terms of the instrument creating the same. Provided, that any trust may
be revoked by the trustor upon the written consent of all living persons having vested
or contingent interest therein." OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 60, § 175.41 (Supp. 1947).
46. N. Y. STAT. ANN., tit. 40, § 23 (1938).
47. Levy v. Empire Trust Co., 269 App. Div. 188, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 817 (1945);
Smith v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 287 N. Y. 500, 41 N. E. 2d 72 (1942) ; Frank-
lin v. Chatham Phoenix Natl. Bank, 234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1932).
It is the intention of the settlor that determines whether interests pass by purchase
or descent: Corbett v. Bank of N. Y., etc., Co., 229 App. Div. 570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638
(1930).
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Estates and Trusts.4" This subject was referred to a subcommittee
which, upon the basis of an investigation and analysis of the existing
law, filed a report strongly urging legislation to provide a means of
relief from trusts which have, for various reasons, outlived their
usefulness, and whose continued existence is a source of hardship
to those who were intended to be benefited.4
The Advisory Committee thoroughly debated the wisdom of such
legislation. In its deliberations it gave careful consideration to the
constitutionality of the statute if made applicable to existing trusts,5
to the possible income and estate tax implications of such legislation,51
48. The Joint State Government Commission of the General Assembly having
been directed to "study, revise and prepare for re-enactment" certain statutory com-
ponents of Decedents' Estate Law, appointed a special committee to consider this sub-
ject. This Committee in turn appointed an Advisory Committee composed of mem-
bers of the Bar, both judges and practitioners, with Robert Brigham, Esquire, as its
Chairman. REPORT, DECEDENTS' ESTATES LAvs OF 1947 1.
49. The following statute was suggested:
"The Court having jurisdiction over an inter vivos trust or a testamentary
trust, heretofore or hereafter created, shall have the power, in its discretion, after
due hearing upon the petition of any interested person or persons and the written
consent of all living persons having a beneficial interest therein (and of the set-
tlor, if alive), to decree the settlement and termination of said trust in whole or
in part, whenever said Court shall be satisfied that the purpose of the trust has
failed, or that the needs of the beneficiaries and the particular circumstances of
the case warrant, or that for other good and sufficient reasons it is advisable to
terminate the said trust in whole or in part.
"As herein used 'beneficial interest' shall mean such an interest in praesente
or in remainder created by the trust instrument as would entitle the beneficiary to
enjoyment of the estate upon the falling in of the preceding estates; 'beneficial in-
terest' shall not include such an interest as would pass to the next of kin of a life
tenant or of a settlor under the intestacy laws."
50. It is well established that retroactive destruction of vested interest is uncon-
stitutional: Wolford v. Morgenthal, 91 Pa. 30 (1879). Reversions are treated as
vested interests: Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304 (1867). It is debatable whether the
same rule applies to contingent remainders and expectancies. See United States v.
Heinrich, 12 F. 2d 938 (D. C. Mont. 1926) ; Stanbach v. Citizens' National Bank of
Raleigh, 197 N. C. 292, 148 S. E. 313 (1929) ; COOLEY, PRINCPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 351 (3d ed. 1898), which indicate that retroactive destruction of contingent inter-
ests is not unconstitutional. But see Cunningham Estate, 340 Pa. 265, 16 A. 2d 712
(1940) and Overbrook Heights B. & L. Association v. Wilson, 333 Pa. 449, 5 A. 2d
529 (1939), indicating that contingent remaindermen have valid property rights.
51. The possible tax liability was based upon the uncertain scope of: (a) Section
166 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides generally for the taxation to the
settlor of income from trusts with respect to which he has the power, either alone or
in conjunction with others not adverse to him, to revoke; and (b) Section 811 (d)
which includes within a grantor's estate any trust pr9perty subject to the exercise by
him, acting alone or in conjunction with others not adverse to him, of a power to
alter, amend, revoke or terminate "without regard to when or from what source the
decedent acquired such power."
(a) Under the rule laid down in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940), the
proposed statute might have increased the tax liability of a settlor. The income from
a trust made revocable by statute is taxable to the settlor: Gaylord v. Commissioner,
153 F. 2d 408 (C. C. A. 9th 1946). However, tax liability is avoided when the power
to revoke must be exercised by the settlor in conjunction with the beneficiaries: Smith
v. Commissioner, 59 F. 2d 56 (C. C. A. 1st 1932). Actually, such a power is no more
than any settlor possesses under general law: Knapp v. Hoey, 24 F. Supp. 39 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1938) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 338 (1935).
(b) The inclusion in a settlor's estate of property which he had, during his life-
time, transferred in trust, depends upon its being subject at his death to a power to
alter, amend, revoke or terminate without regard to the source of that power or the
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and to the burden which might be cast upon the courts if too broad
discretion to terminate trusts were conferred upon them.5"
Section 2 of the Estates Act of 1947 finally emerged.53 It pro-
vides, as follows:
"SECTION 2. Termination of Trusts.
(a) Failure of Original Purpose. The court having juris-
diction of a trust, regardless of any spendthrift or similar pro-
vision therein, in its discretion may terminate such trust in whole
or in part, or make an allowance from principal to a conveyor, his
spouse, issue, parents, or any of them, who is an income bene-
ficiary, provided the court after hearing is satisfied that the
original purpose of the conveyor cannot be carried out or is im-
practical of fulfillment and that the termination, partial termina-
tion, or allowance more nearly approximates the intention of the
conveyor, and notice is given to all parties in interest or to their
duly appointed fiduciaries. But, distributions of principal under
this section, whether by termination, partial termination, or allow-
'ance, shall not exceed an aggregate value of twenty-five thousand
dollars from all trusts created by the same conveyor.
(b) Distribution of Terminated Trust. Whenever the court
shall decree termination or partial termination of a trust under
the provisions of this section, it shall thereupon order such dis-
tribution of the principal and undistributed income as it deems
proper and as nearly as possible in conformity with the conveyor's
intention.
(c) Other Powers. Nothing in this section shall limit
any power of the court to terminate or reform a trust under exist-
ing law."
(b) Analysis of Section 2
1. Jurisdiction
The power to decree the termination of a trust, or to make an
allowance from the principal thereof in the manner provided in Sec-
tion 2 is given to "the court having jurisdiction of the trust." The
persons with whom it must be exercised. Consequently, a trust made revocable by
statute is includable in the settlor's estate. Vaccaro v. U. S., 149 F. 2d 1014 (C. C. A.
5th 1945).
Furthermore, the fact that the power may not be exercisable for the pecuniary
benefit of the settlor does not avoid the liability of his estate: Commissioner v. Holmes,
326 U. S. 480 (1946). However, when the power is exercisable only in conjunction
with the beneficiaries, having interests adverse to the settlor, it is questionable whether
tax liability would be imposed. See Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935). So
long as the power exercisable by the settlor, in conjunction with the beneficiaries, is
equivalent to that accorded by general law, there would seem to be no tax incident.
But see Estate of H. A. Cannon, 40 B. T. A. 508 (1939).
52. The courts have assumed a heavy burden in the adoption of the "failure of
purpose" doctrine. It is to be hoped that the new legislation will not materially increase
this load.
53. See note 4 supra.
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Orphans' Court has exclusive jurisdiction of testamentary trusts.5 4
The Orphans' Court and the Courts of Common Pleas have concurrent
jurisdiction of inter vivos trusts.5 Consequently, termination proceed-
ings may be instituted in the Orphans' Court or Common Pleas Court,
depending upon the nature of the trust involved.
2. Discretionary Termination
The relief provided in Section 2, whether in the nature of total
or partial termination, or allowance from principal, may not be claimed
by a petitioner as of right. Assuming that all of the requirements
imposed by Section 2 as conditions to granting the relief sought are
met, such relief will be granted only if the court "in its discretion"
decides so to act. In this respect Section 2 differs from the corre-
sponding statutes of New York,5" North Carolina 57 and Oklahoma 5
which give to the settlor, under specified circumstances, the power to
revoke trust interests, without subjecting the exercise of that power
to judicial sanction. The absence of judicial supervision over exercise
of a power to revoke may be justified under those statutes, since the
destruction of the trust may be undertaken only by the creator. In
such cases, there can be no violence done to the settlor's intent, and,
consequently, there is probably less need for the court to scrutinize
the proceedings. 9 Under Section 2, however, termination may be
decreed without regard to the consent of the settlor, and making
termination a matter of judicial discretion provides a safeguard against
wanton disregard of the settlor's intention. Aside from affording some
measure of sanctity to the settlor's intention, 0 recourse to judicial
discretion will prevent the widespread destruction of trusts which
might otherwise ensue.
One other consequence of entrusting the power to terminate to
the court rather than to the settlor and/or other persons interested in
the trust may be briefly noted here. The sections of the Internal
54. Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 363, § 9(b), PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 2242 (Purdon,
1930).
55. Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 363, § 9(n), added June 26, 1931, P. L. 1389, § 1,
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 2253 (a) (Purdon, 1930) ; Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784,
§ 13, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 281 (Purdon, 1930) ; see Padelford v. Trust Co., 121 Pa.
Super. 193, 183 At!. 451 (1936).
56. See note 46 szpra.
57. See note 44 supra.
58. See note 45 supra.
59. Compare note 12 supra with RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 338, 339 (1935).
60. Precedent for disregarding the settlor's intention, even with respect to trusts
created before enactment of the statute, may be found in the Act of April 14, 1931,
P. L. 29, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 3251 (Purdon, 1930), which provided, retroactively,
for the termination of testamentary trusts in which vested charitable remainders fol-
lowed life estates. The constitutionality of the Act was upheld in Derbyshire's Estate,
16 D. & C. 200 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1932).
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Revenue Code which, under certaift circumstances, tax to a settlor the
income from a trust," and to his estate the corpus thereof,6 2 are
based broadly on the retention by the settlor of some powers of eco-
nomic control. Section 2 entrusts that power not to the settlor but to
the discretion of the court. It may be, therefore, that whatever tax
consequences may have flowed from Section 2 are thereby dissipated.6"
3. Limitations on Discretion
The discretion which the court, in a Section 2 proceeding, may
exercise is subject to its finding, after due hearing, "that the original
purpose of the conveyor cannot be carried out or is impractical of
fulfillment and that the termination, partial termination or allowance
more nearly approximates the intention of the conveyor." In so re-
stricting the exercise of the court's discretion, the statute makes no
distinction between inter vivbs and testamentary trusts or between
termination proceedings in which the settlor joins and those in which
he does not.6 A showing of impossibility of fulfillment of the trust
purpose and of approximation of the settlor's consent is required in
all attempts to terminate. Insofar as this requirement is imposed upon
attempts at termination in which the settlor joins, Section 2 provides
a more exacting termination procedure than the Restatement. 5 How-
ever the existing law in Pennsylvania, as a result of the decision in
Bowers' Trust Estate,66 would seem to permit termination upon the
consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries regardless of any unfulfilled
trust purpose.67  This case law is expressly preserved.6"
Applied to testamentary trusts, or inter vivos trusts, where the
settlor is deceased, the requirement of a showing that the trust purpose
is "impractical of fulfillment" is a codification of the existing law and
is in accord with the Restatement.69 A trust whose purpose "is im-
practical of fulfillment" is a trust whose purpose has failed. Conse-
quently, the facts which have heretofore impelled a court to find a
61. INT. REv. CODE § 166.
62. INT. Rev. CODE § 811(d).
63. It may be doubted that Section 2 would have created the suggested income or
estate tax liability, even though the power to terminate were given, not to the court,
but to the settlor acting with the consent of the beneficiaries. See Knapp v. Hoey, 24
F. Supp. 39 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1938) ; Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935).
64. The distinction is made in RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 337, 338 (1935), and was
approved and adopted in Bowers' Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 29 A. 2d 519 (1943).
65. Where the settlor consents to termination, it is immaterial that any trust pur-
pose remains unfulfilled: RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 338 (1935).
66. 346 Pa. 85, 29 A. 2d 519 (1943).
67. The facts in Bowers' Trust Estate, supra, might have justified a finding of
failure of purpose, but the court did not base its decision on that ground. See note 36
.spra.
68. The right of a petitioner to proceed under the more liberal rules of existing
law is expressly preserved by subsection (c) of Section 2.
69. See note 28 supra. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS §337(2) (1935).
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failure of purpose"m and to terminate a trust should be equally per-
suasive and effective to warrant a finding that the trust purpose "is
impractical of fulfillment." This legislative recognition of the failure
of purpose doctrine may even be held to supply the courts with the
requisite authority to terminate the so-called nuisance trusts.7
1
In addition to showing that the purpose of the trust "is im-
practical of fulfillment," it is necessary to show, as a condition to
the exercise of judicial discretion, that termination "more nearly
approximates the intention of the conveyor." These two requirements
are imposed conjunctively. In other words, a showing that termina-
tion more nearly approximates the intention of the conveyor cannot
be made alternatively to a showing of faillire of purpose, but must be
made additionally. Consequently, the inability to convince the court
that termination approximates the intention of the settlor might bar
termination even though failure of purpose is shown.7 It becomes
important, therefore, to examine the import of the requirement "more
nearly approximates the intention of the conveyor."
The statute contains no definition of the "intention" of the
settlor which must be approximated by termination. That intention
may be construed to be the original intention which the settlor had
(and may have declared) when he created the trust. Such a con-
struction, however, would, under the statute, be inoperative in a,great
many cases. Thus, a statement in the trust instrument that it is the
settlor's express intention that the trust shall continue for a specified
period might be effective to prevent termination prior to the expiration
of that period, regardless of the compelling equitable considerations
which the proponents of termination may demonstrate. Furthermore,
such an interpretation would seem to render of no avail the settlor's
consent to termination if that consent conflicted with a clearly expressed
original intention. Such a construction of "intention," which would
frustrate an attempted termination regardless of the circumstances
existing at the time the attempt was made, would seem to ignore the
end sought to be attained by Section 2, namely, a more liberal termina-
tion procedure in hardship cases."
On the other hand, the statute might be construed to refer to the
settlor's intention at the time termination is sought or, if he be dead,
70. Cases cited note 21 supra.
71. In view of the clearly expressed policy underlying Section 2, that is, to pro-
vide relief from oppressive trusts, the section itself may be too deferential to the set-
tlor's intention. See note 60 supra. In New York an express declaration by the set-
tlor to the effect that he intends the trust to be irrevocable is ineffective to prevent the
application of that revocation statute. Pulsifer v. Monges, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 367 (1946).
72. This is the rationale adopted by RESTATEmENT, TRusTs § 336 (1935), and the
cases cited notes 21 and 22 supra.
73. See note 49 supra.
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an intention which might be reasonably attributed to him under the
then existing circumstances. Under this construction, the requirement
would obviously be met in any case in which the settlor joins in the
petition for termination, and is not complied with when he objects
thereto.
An intermediate view, and one which would avoid the extremes
inherent in the interpretations just adverted to, would construe "inten-
tion" as the motive which the settlor had when he created the trust.
If the motive of the settlor was to provide a reasonably stable income
for the life beneficiaries, then, if circumstances warrant, that motive
should be effectuated in a termination proceeding. Adoption of this
construction will involve an ascertainment of the motive which impelled
creation of the trust and an application of that motive to the cir-
cumstances existing when termination is sought.
In selecting the proper construction of "intention," consideration
should be given to the evident desire of the Advisory Committee to
liberalize termination procedure. It is to be hoped that when this
problem is presented for judicial determination the courts will endeavor
to effectuate the underlying purpose of Section 2.
4. Spendthrift Trusts
If the requirements just discussed are satisfied, termination may
be decreed even though the trust contains spendthrift provisions. By
its wording, Section 2 apparently neutralizes spendthrift provisions
as a factor in a termination proceeding, and in so doing makes no
distinction between inter vivos and testamentary trusts. Insofar as
Section 2 is applicable to testamentary spendthrift trusts and inter
vivos spendthrift trusts where the settlor is dead, Section 2 marks a
departure from the existing law of Pennsylvania 7 and from that
set forth in the Restatement,75 both of which preclude termination of
such trusts.7" Under Section 2, the inclusion of spendthrift provisions
is expressly stated to be of no consequence. It would seem, therefore,
that where termination of a trust, whether inter vivos or testamentary,
is resisted solely on the ground of the presence of a spendthrift clause
in the trust instrument, and no other unfulfilled trust purpose is shown,
the exceptants would be unsuccessful and termination would be
granted.
74. See Bowers' Trust Estate, 346 Pa. 85, 88, 29 A. 2d 519, 520 (1943), and cases
there cited.
75. RESTATEmiENT, TRuSTS § 337(2), comment b (1935).
76. But a testamentary spendthrift trust whose purpose has failed may be termi-
nated. Auchu's Estate, 38 D. & C. 33 (Pa. Or. Ct. 1939).
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Two arguments may conceivably be advanced to refute this posi-
tion. In the first place, it may be urged that inclusion of spendthrift
provisions is an indication that termination can never approximate
the settlor's intention. This argument, however, ignores the clear
import of the words "regardless of any spendthrift . . . provision!'
which preclude the use of such provisions as a bar to termination. In
the second place, it may be argued that termination being discretionary,
the court should, in the exercise of proper discretion, refuse to terminate
a testamentary spendthrift trust. However, it would seem that such
a refusal would be an abuse of discretion, if all the other factors neces-
sary to warrant termination are present.
Applied to inter vivos spendthrift trusts, the settlor of which is
alive and consenting, Section 2 merely codifies the law enunciated in
Bowers' Estate.7  No longer is a spendthrift provision an obstacle to
termination in such cases.
5. Total or Partial Termination
In the event that, under all of the circumstances, the court deter-
mines to exercise the discretion conferred by Section 2, it may order
a total or partial termination of the trust. Such relief may be granted
upon application of, and in favor of, any beneficiary, regardless of
relationship to the settlor. Although termination "in part" is not
defined, it probably signifies the termination of the interest of one or
more beneficiaries whose total interests comprise less than the whole
of the trust.78  Of course, it could be construed to mean termination
of part of a trust in whikh a beneficiary had an interest.
6. Allowance From Principal
Where termination is sought on behalf of "a conveyor, his spouse,
issue, parents, or any of them, who is an income beneficiary," the court
may, as an alternative to total or partial termination, permit an allow-
ance from principal. In order to merit such relief it is not only
necessary that the applicant therefor fall within the enumerated classes,
but he must also be an income beneficiary. Consequently, a remainder-
man is excluded, regardless of his relationship to the settlor.79 How-
ever, where the applicant is within the specified designations and is an
77. 346 Pa. 85, 29 A. 2d 519 (1943). If, however, it should be held that such
inter vivos spendthrift trusts are terminable only upon a showing of failure of purpose
and approximation of intention, then Section 2 conflicts with Bowers' Trust Estate.
78. This appears to be the meaning of "partial termination" as employed in RE-
STATEmENT, TRUSTS § 340(1) (1935).
79. Subject, of course, to the right of the remaindermen, preserved by subsection
(c) of Section 2, to proceed under existing law.
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income beneficiary, he may be entitled (in addition to the relief of
partial termination) to an allowance from principal.
This provision, in effect, grants to the court a limited power of
consumption where such action is warranted under the circumstances
of the particular case. For example, evidence may be adduced to
show that a testator was accustomed to, and intended to, provide his
wife with an income of $3,000 per year; that diminishing returns on
securities have reduced the income from the trust to $1,000 per year;
and that rising costs of living have decreased the purchasing power
of the dollar. Under such circumstances, Section 2 empowers the
court to make up the deficiency by directing the trustee to distribute
$3,000 or more per year out of principal 80 (or a total distribution of
income and principal of $3,000 or more per year).
7. Notice to Parties in Interest
It is in the complete removal of the requirement that the consent
of all interested parties be obtained as a condition to termination that
Section 2 makes the most radical departure from existing law. As
previously pointed out, the consent of all beneficiaries has always been
regarded as essential to termination,"' and the impossibility of ob-
taining such consent has often presented an insuperable obstacle in
termination proceedings. The rigidity of this requirement has been
relaxed in those states whose statutes were previously noted. In New
York"2 and Oklahoma 83 the consenting class includes only persons
who are living and who take, not by descent, but by purchase. In
North Carolina, contingent interests in persons "not in esse or not
determined until the happening of a future event may at any time, prior
to the happening of the contingency . . . " be revoked without their
consent. 84 Section 2 of the Estates Act goes farther than any of
these statutes by eliminating the necessity of obtaining the consent of
anyone.8 5
As a substituted means of protecting the interests of the various
beneficiaries, the statute requires "notice . . to all parties in interest
or to their duly appointed fiduciaries." The Act contains no definition
of parties in interest. It may be assumed, however, that "all parties
in interest" comprehends the same persons whose consent has here-
80. Provided, however, that such distributions do not exceed a total of $25,000.
81. Cases cited note 37 supra.
82. See note 46 supra.
83. See note 45 supra.
84. See note 44 supra.
85. The suggested draft which was submitted by the Sub-Committee provided for
the consent of the settlor (if living) and all persons having a beneficial interest in the
trust. See note 49 supra.
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tofore been required. 6 "Their duly appointed fiduciaries" undoubtedly
refers to guardians ad litem for minors, or trustees ad litem for unborn
or unascertained beneficiaries.
"The use of notice instead of consent liberalizes the termination
procedure. A guardian or trustee, whether general or ad litem, may
feel that he does not have the power, or at least does not wish to
consent to the termination of a trust. However, that same guardian
or trustee may not feel obligated to object to such termination. Con-
sequently, notice is a much more liberal requirement than consent.
The use of notice instead of consent may have the effect of
eliminating tax liability that might possibly result if trusts were made
terminable upon the consent, inter alia, of the settlorST
Whatever effect the device of notice may have on any possible
tax implications created by Section 2, it is clear that one of the classic
obstacles to trust termination is thereby removed. Since it is no
longer essential to obtain the consent of beneficiaries, it will not now
be possible for remote and unascertained remaindermen to frustrate a
desirable termination. Theoretically, it is now possible to obtain
termination without the consent of any beneficiary or of the settlor.
Practically, of course, since the granting of termination is discretionary
only, a court will deny that relief where the owners of substantial
trust interests refuse to consent. The real significance of Section 2 is
that it removes from termination proceedings the absolute bar that
often resulted from the requirement of plenary consent. Under Sec-
tion 2, termination may be decreed if the equitable circumstances
warrant, and regardless of inability to obtain the consent of all parties.
8. The $25,000 Limitation
The relief which may be granted under Section 2, "whether by
termination, partial termination, or allowance," is restricted to a
maximum aggregate of $25,000 "from all trusts created by the same
conveyor." This limitation had its genesis in the desire to restrict
any possible tax implications of Section 2 88 to only $25,000 of the
settlor's trust property. The limitation amounts to a hedge against
the possibility that the preventive measures taken by the draftsmen
86. The taxable incident, contemplated by the Internal Revenue Code § 811(d)
is the death of a settlor of an inter vivos trust which had been subject to his exercise
of a power to revoke, alter, amend or terminate. The section has no application to
a testamentary trust. Consequently, whatever possible danger may have been involved
in the use of "consent" as a condition to terminating an inter vivos trust, would not
have been involved in testamentary trusts.
87. That is, those persons whose continued interest in the trust estate is equiva-
lent to an absolute fee. Donnan's Estate, 339 Pa. 43, 13 A. 2d 55 (1940).
88. See note 51 supra.
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might be ineffective to prevent tax liability."9 In addition, it con-
stitutes a boundary beyond which the broadened powers of termination
therein contained may not be exercised.
Where the maximum relief is exhausted by decrees directing allow-
ances from principal or partial termination in favor of some bene-
ficiaries, thereafter no further relief under the statute may be permitted
regardless of the compelling circumstances inducing the subsequent
request." Since the limitation is applied collectively to all trusts
created by the same settlor or testator, exhaustion of the maximum by
allowance from one trust will constitute an absolute bar to subsequent
recourse to the corpus of other trusts. This, of course, places a certain
premium upon the timeliness and diligence of the first beneficiary, or
beneficiaries, in requesting court relief from specific trusts. This
consequence, however, unfortunately flows from the tax protection
this restriction was intended to provide.
9. Distribution
The distribution of principal and undistributed income of a
terminated trust shall be such as the court "deems proper," and con-
forms "as nearly as possible . . . with the conveyor's intention." 91
In awarding the trust corpus to the beneficiaries the court will give heed
to the express terms of the trust instrument. As a practical matter,
however, it will now be possible to make distribution in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, subject to judicial approval.
10. Preservation of Existing Law
It has been pointed out that in some respects the termination
procedure established by Section 2 is more restricted than under exist-
ing law. 2  The general purpose of the draftsmen, however, was to
broaden, not narrow the law of termination. Consequently, subpara-.
graph (c) was inserted in the section to insure the preservation in
entirety of existing law.93
89. If no tax liability was involved, the limitation was unnecessary. It was not
necessary to apply the limitation to testamentary trusts. See note 86 supra.
90. See note 79 supra.
91. The method of distribution provided by Section 2 approximates that set forth
in RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 347, comments b and o (1935).
92. See note 65 supra.
93. In Bonsall's Estate, 60 D. & C. 76a (1947), the court held the enactment of
Section 2 to be indicative of the fact that termination was a matter outside the scope
of Act of June 1, 1945, P. L. 1337, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 581 (Purdon, Supp. 1946)
(which was codified in the Estates Act as § 3) and could not be accomplished by re-
course to that Act. In that case testator created a spendthrift trust for his wife for life
with remainder to his grandchild. In order to terminate for the benefit of the grandchild,
the widow attempted to release her life estate. In holding that the Act of 1945 does
not permit termination, the court referred to the enactment of Section 2 as indicative
of the fact that prior thereto such trusts could not be terminated.
We concur with the court that the Act of 1945 was not applicable. Query, how-
ever, whether the court's reasoning conflicts with the policy of subsection 2 to pre-
serve intact all existing means whereby termination may be effected.
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11. Prospective Operation of Statute
By the express terms of the Estates Act, the operation of Section
2 is confined to trusts created on and after January 1, 1948."' Being
prospective in nature only, the statute does not apply to trusts in
existence prior to that date. Therefore, no relief will be available in
such trusts which are burdensome, oppressive, or have outlived their
usefulness, unless grounds for termination are available under existing
law.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 2 represents an important step forward in the law of
termination of trusts. An appraisal of its real worth, however, must
be deferred pending an opportunity to observe the manner in which
it operates and to examine the problems which it creates. It is to be
hoped that the courts will interpret the statute liberally as legislative
authority to broaden and extend their power in termination cases,
and, in particular, to provide them with the machinery to lighten or
eliminate the burden of the oppressive trust.
94. Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. -, PA. STAT. Axr., tit. 20, § 301.21 (Purdon,
Supp. 1947) (effective January 1, 1948).
